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According to dual processing theory there are two types, or modes, of thinking: system 1, which involves
intuitive and nonreflective thinking, and system 2, which is more deliberate and requires conscious effort
and thought. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a widely used and robust three item instrument that
measures the tendency to override system 1 thinking and to engage in reflective, system 2 thinking. Each
item on the CRT has an intuitive (but wrong) answer that must be rejected in order to answer the item
correctly. We therefore hypothesized that performance on the CRT may give useful insights into the
cognitive processes involved in learning physics, where success involves rejecting the common, intuitive
ideas about the world (often called misconceptions) and instead carefully applying physical concepts. This
paper presents initial results from an ongoing study examining the relationship between students’ CRT
scores and their performance on the Force Concept Inventory (FCI), which tests students’ understanding
of Newtonian mechanics. We find that a higher CRT score predicts a higher FCI score for both precourse
and postcourse tests. However, we also find that the FCI normalized gain is independent of CRT score.
The implications of these results are discussed.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevPhysEducRes.12.023101
I. INTRODUCTION
Dual processing theory refers to a collection of models in
cognitive psychology that describe two systems of thinking:
system 1, which involves intuitive and nonreflective think-
ing, and system 2, which is more deliberate and requires
conscious effort and thought (see, e.g., Refs. [1,2]). System 2
enables us to solve complex problems, but tends to be
slow and demands high concentration and computational
power. System 1, on the other hand, is quick and requires
low computational power, but is less suited to many tasks
involving higher-order thinking. Humans have a strong bias
towards system 1 processing, and are often described as
“cognitive misers” [3]. A three item instrument called the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is commonly used to
distinguish between peoples’ tendency to engage in these
two types of thinking. Devised in 2005 by Frederick [4],
the CRT has been used particularly for assessing intuitive-
analytic cognitive styles [5]. The three questions used in the
standard CRT adapted from Ref. [4] are as follows:
(1) A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs
£1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball
cost? (Intuitive answer 10p, correct answer 5p) [6].
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets,
how long would it take 100 machines to make 100
widgets? (Intuitive answer 100, correct answer 5).
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the
patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch
to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for
the patch to cover half of the lake? (Intuitive answer
24, correct answer 47).
Each question on the CRT is designed to reliably cue an
intuitive, but incorrect answer. For example, in question 1,
the answer that initially comes to mind for most people is
10p. Although only a very simple calculation is required to
check this answer, 10p is consistently the most common
wrong answer (even for students at MIT [2]), indicating that
people have responded with their initial, intuitive (system 1)
response. To get the question correct requires the answerer
to consciously reject this initial answer and to correctly
calculate the new answer. The CRT therefore measures the
tendency to override an initial, intuitive answer (system 1)
and then to engage in more reflective thought (system 2) to
determine the correct answer.
Performance on the CRT has been shown to correlate
with a variety of measures involved with decision making,
as well as measures of intelligence, cognitive reflection [4],
and logical reasoning ability [7]. Although the CRT
correlates with both intelligence measures and numeracy,
there is general agreement that the CRT is not simply a
measure of numerical ability [3,8,9] and that the CRT
explains additional variance in reasoning and decision-
making tasks when numeracy and intelligence are taken
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into account [3]. The CRT is also a powerful predictor
of someone’s likelihood of engaging in rational decisions
and their ability to make unbiased judgments. However,
performance on the CRT can also be affected by context: in
one study, students made fewer errors when the test was
presented in a lighter, harder to read font compared to the
normal version. Alter et al. hypothesized that the difficult to
read version invoked system 2 thinking [10].
A. Rationale
Our work was motivated by the possible similarity
between the cognitive challenges of the CRT and those
faced by students learning physics. Students often demon-
strate naive or intuitive ideas when answering physics
questions which are based on their experience of the
world, but which, from a scientific perspective, are incor-
rect. These incorrect answers are often referred to as
“misconceptions.”
However, there is debate about the role that misconcep-
tions play in learning physics. This is important because
how misconceptions are viewed affects approaches to
teaching. The two most common theories that discuss
cognitive processing in physics are the “knowledge as
theory” [11] perspective, which views student knowledge
as consistent and resistant to change, and the “knowledge in
pieces” perspective [12], in which students’ cognition is
seen as highly context dependent and therefore changeable.
In the knowledge as theory perspective, misconceptions are
viewed as ideas that are likely to hinder learning. Teaching
is therefore focused on challenging these misconceptions
through conceptual change.
In contrast, researchers who view knowledge as being
“in pieces” [12,13] see students’ ideas as fragmentary,
transient, and context dependent. From this perspective,
the resources available to students have a much smaller
grain size, for instance, knowledge elements [14] or
p-prims [15,16], basic units of intuitive resources gained
from experience of the world. Learning is seen as a process
of developing “patterns of association” [14] which can both
help and hinder the individual in solving physics problems.
Dual processing theory may provide an alternative
approach to understanding the role of misconceptions in
learning physics.
B. Approach
We hypothesized that the cognitive processes involved
in answering the CRT are similar to those involved in
conceptual understanding of physics, particularly in areas
where misconceptions are common, such as Newtonian
mechanics.
In order to test this we analyzed how students perform
both on the CRT and on a commonly used test of
conceptual understanding—the Force Concept Inventory
(FCI). The FCI is a 30 item multiple-choice test designed
by Hestenes et al. [17] and updated in 1995 [18] that
gives a measure of students’ conceptual understanding of
Newtonian mechanics. The test builds on the work of
Halloun and Hestenes [19], which found that common
sense beliefs about motion had a large effect on perfor-
mance in physics. To design the FCI students were
interviewed and the incorrect ideas that they had about
concepts in Newtonian mechanics were used as the basis
for the test distracters. As misconceptions are stable and
resistant to change under traditional instruction [11,20],
answering FCI questions correctly could be said to involve
two steps: first, students must discard options that con-
stitute an intuitive (but incorrect) response, and second,
they must use appropriate conceptual reasoning about a
physical situation to find the correct answer. We do not
know for sure what students are thinking, but as miscon-
ceptions are so prevalent, at least for novices, this seems
to be plausible and therefore worth investigating further.
We therefore hypothesize that students who score higher
on the CRT will also score higher on the FCI.
II. CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY
The research described here involved students studying
an introductory calculus-based Newtonian mechanics
course at the University of Edinburgh, UK. Typical class
sizes are 200–300 students with a gender ratio of around
80∶20 males to females. Students taking this course were
both physics majors and nonmajors, although all students
must satisfy the entry requirements for the physics
degree program. The course has a “flipped” structure in
which students are expected to do prereadings and an
online quiz before the lecture. The lecture time then
consists of interactive engagement pedagogies, primarily
Peer Instruction (see Wood et al. [21] for more details). The
average normalized FCI gain for the course is 0.5 0.1.
The FCI was administered online via the web-based
course management system in week 1 and again in week 10
of the first semester in order to measure the learning gain of
the students. Students completed the test in their own time
but were restricted to 90 min. Our results on the FCI are
comparable to those from other UK institutions who use a
paper-based test under test conditions [22]. The CRT
questions were delivered via the Top Hat online response
system. This is a web-based system, and students respond
via smart phones, tablets, laptops, or any other web-enabled
device. The system supports multiple-choice, free text,
numerical, ranking, and other question types. For the CRT
questions we used the numerical response question type.
The CRT questions were delivered during the second
lecture of the course, during the first week of instruction.
Since the CRT questions are seemingly trivial, and obvi-
ously unrelated to the content of the course, they might
seem incongruous to the students. Consequently, the
students might seek out the “trick” to the questions, thus
possibly overriding system 1 thinking. To attempt to
counteract this, a mild subterfuge was used: the Top Hat
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system was being used for the first time in this academic
year, and its predecessor system supported only multiple-
choice questions. The students were informed that they
were going to be given “three quick questions to try out the
numerical response capabilities of the new system,” thus
obfuscating the intent of the questions. The three CRT
questions were delivered in quick succession over a 3 min
period, and the correct answers were not revealed until
student responses for all questions had been collected, thus
not “tipping off” the students that the intuitive answers
were not correct.
In total 148 students answered every question on the
CRT and also completed both the FCI precourse and FCI
postcourse tests. One limitation of this study is that some
students only answered one or two questions on the CRT
rather than all three. Data from these students were not
included in the analysis, as failure to answer a question may
have been due to technical problems. However, if students
left an answer blank because they did not know the answer
to the question, there may be a bias in our results towards
those who score more highly on the CRT.
III. RESULTS
Students scored higher on the CRT than is typical for the
general population [23], with 74% answering Q1 correctly,
71% answering Q2 correctly, and 86% answering Q3
correctly. This may be because the students studied in this
research are likely to have much better than average
mathematical skills and score higher on intelligence mea-
sures, both of which are known to aid performance on
the CRT [24]. However, the general trend seen between
questions is similar to that reported in the literature,
with students scoring higher on question 3 compared to
questions 1 and 2.
We also found, as expected, that the intuitive heuristic
answer accounted for the majority (72%) of all wrong
answers. For Q1, 90% of students who answered incor-
rectly did so with the heuristic answer. For Q2 and Q3, this
was 49% and 45%, respectively, but the heuristic answer
was still the most common wrong answer.
CRT scores were calculated for each student by counting
the number of items answered correctly, giving a CRT score
of between zero (all questions answered incorrectly) and
three (all questions answered correctly). FCI scores for pre-
and postcourse tests (out of a maximum of 30) were
calculated by counting the number of questions that the
student answered correctly. Table I shows the percentage
(and number) of students with each CRT score for the
148 students in this study. For comparison we have also
given the results from a meta-analysis of 118 studies across
the general population. Our results closely resemble those
fromMIT students studied by Frederick [4], who compared
CRT scores for a range of different populations, including
students at a number of different universities. The MIT
students were the highest scoring of the populations that he
investigated.
Figure 1 shows the median FCI score for students as a
function of their CRT score for both precourse and
postcourse FCI tests. A clear positive relationship is seen
between precourse FCI score and CRT score, with students
who score zero on the CRT scoring 12 points on average
less on the FCI compared to the students who scored 3 on
the CRT. The change in FCI scores is particularly pro-
nounced between those who scored zero and one on the
CRT and between those who scored one and two on the
CRT. A smaller gap is seen between those scoring two and
three on the CRT. The overall pattern is similar, but less
pronounced, for the postcourse FCI: the gap in FCI score
between students scoring zero and those scoring three on
the CRT is 9.5. A Pearson correlation coefficient was
calculated to be 0.38 (precourse test) and 0.32 (postcourse
test). However, this assumes a linear relationship between
the variables. In both pre- and postcourse tests the increase
in FCI score for students scoring a CRT of three compared
to students scoring two is smaller than would be expected
for a linear relationship. It may be that a flooring effect is
evident here; the CRT is unable to discriminate effectively
between students at the top end of the CRT. This criticism is
TABLE I. Percentage of students with each CRT score. Numbers in brackets give the number of students.
Percentage of students with each CRT score (number of students) 0 1 2 3 Mean
University of Edinburgh (148) 5 (8) 16 (23) 22 (32) 57 (85) 2.31
Meta-analysis [23] 38 23 21 18 Not known
FIG. 1. Median FCI score versus CRT score for precourse and
postcourse FCI tests. Uncertainties are standard error on the
median calculated as described in Ref. [25].
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discussed by Toplak et al. [9], who have proposed a longer
CRT consisting of seven items, which those authors hope
will overcome this weakness. A test that is better able to
discriminate between students who do well on the CRT
may result in a stronger correlation between FCI and CRT
scores.
Figure 2 shows the average normalized FCI gain as a
function of CRT score. The normalized gain for each
student is calculated as
hGi ¼ hFCIposti − hFCIprei
30 − hFCIprei
; ð1Þ
where 30 corresponds to the maximum possible FCI score
and the angle brackets on the right-hand side indicate
medians (rather than means). The figure shows that the
average normalized gain on the FCI is independent of CRT
score (Pearson’s correlation coefficient was calculated to be
0.07). This is a surprising result, implying that improve-
ment in conceptual understanding of Newtonian mechanics
is independent of cognitive reflection, as measured by the
CRT. In fact, the absolute change in FCI score is slightly
larger for the group that scored zero on the CRT compared
to the group that scored three (see Fig. 1). This finding is at
odds with research reported by Shtulman and McCallum
[26], who measured science understanding across a number
of different fields (including astronomy, evolution, geology,
mechanics, perception, and thermodynamics) and found
that cognitive reflection was a significant predictor of
science understanding. They concluded that “These results
suggest that cognitive reflection may be a prerequisite for
changing certain cognitive structures, namely, concepts and
theories” [26].
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We presented an analysis of the relationship between
students’ score on the Cognitive Reflection Test and their
performance on the Force Concept Inventory. We find a
clear relationship between the two tests, with students who
score higher on the CRT gaining higher scores on the FCI,
for both the precourse and postcourse administrations of the
test. We also found that the normalized gain on the FCI was
independent of CRT score.
These findings indicate that students who are more likely
to override the system 1 intuitive response and to engage in
the more demanding cognitive reflection needed to answer
the CRT question correctly are also more likely to score
highly on the FCI, implying that similar cognitive proc-
esses account for at least some of the cognitive abilities
needed for each test. Although clearly more research is
needed, this result has important implications for the way
that the nature of student difficulties with physics are
thought about. A dual processing theory approach has not
received much attention in the physics education literature
(however, see Refs. [27,28]), but our findings suggest that
this perspective offers a promising approach for under-
standing physics students’ difficulties.
A dual processing perspective combines aspects of
both the “knowledge as theory” and “knowledge in
pieces” perspectives, described earlier. Intuitive ideas
developed from experiences of the world are likely to
be deeply ingrained and could therefore become heuristics
that are adopted as system 1 responses. This may explain
why some misconceptions seem to be common and
universal. Students who tend to be “cognitive misers”
will be more likely to answer physics questions with their
intuitive ideas. However, students who are able to override
these intuitive responses and to engage in system 2
thinking are much more likely to then activate appropriate
physics resources to enable them to answer the question
correctly. Activation of resources can therefore be seen as
something that is dependent on both the context of the
problem and the individual characteristics of the students.
This view is similar to that described by the “resources
model” [29,30] in which students’ incorrect responses
are thought to result from students not activating the
appropriate resources, rather than because they do not
have the physics knowledge necessary to correctly answer
the problem.
Our finding that the normalized FCI gain is independent
of CRT score raises further questions about the role of
misconceptions in learning physics. We find that students
who are likely to rely on system 1 thinking (and therefore
to choose the intuitive option), as measured by the CRT,
see a similar improvement in conceptual understanding
as students who override their intuitive ideas and engage
system 2 thinking. This result implies that even though
misconceptions in the form of common intuitive ideas seem
to exist, they do not hinder the development of more
scientific views of the world.
The implications of a dual processing theory perspec-
tive for physics instruction are twofold. Firstly, the idea
FIG. 2. Median FCI normalized gain versus CRT score.
Uncertainties are standard error on the median.
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that misconceptions are deeply ingrained intuitive ideas
that are activated through system 1 thinking, without
conscious thought, implies that students should be helped
to develop the cognitive reflection skills necessary to
override system 1 and to engage in system 2 thinking.
Secondly, rather than challenging misconceptions,
teaching should focus on building connections between
scientific ideas, so that appropriate resources can be more
readily activated.
Although more work is clearly needed, we believe that a
dual processing perspective has the potential to further our
understanding of learning in physics. These results are the
initial findings of a more detailed study which will be
presented in due course. We encourage other researchers to
replicate, extend, and build on these findings in different
contexts and using different measures of physics under-
standing, so that the role that dual processing theory may
have can be further explored.
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